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Abstract:
Bagwell and Ramey (1 9 9 1 ) show that limit pricing does not occur as an 
equilibrium stra tegy  in oligopoly if entrants are uncertain about an 
industry c o st  parameter. I show that if entrants are uncertain about 
firm -specific co st parameters of oligopoly incumbents, there are 






















































































































































































October 5, 1992 1
I. Introduction
Bagwell and Ramey [1991] model noncooperative entry deterrence 
duopoly when incumbents' c o s ts  depend on an industry c o s t  parameter. 
Because incumbents' c o s ts  are both high or both low, plausible pooling 
equilibria fail to ex ist: in equilibrium, an entrant can infer the  
true value of the industry c o st  parameter by observing incumbents' 
prices.
There are no doubt cases in which one would exp ect a common 
industry characteristic to  affect all firms' c o s ts  in the same way. 
Examples might be the extraction  of oil by different firms from a 
single oil field or the ex isten ce of an industry-wide union wage 
agreement.1 But there must be many more ca ses in which c o s ts , while 
unknown to  an entrant, vary among incumbents on a firm -specific basis. 
In particular, the case in which a potential entrant contem plates an 
industry w ith multiple incumbents, some of which may have high c o s ts  
while others may have low c o s ts , is surely of in terest.
In th is paper, I show that if an entrant's uncertainty about 
incumbents' c o s ts  is firm -specific rather than industry specific , then  
there are conditions under which a sequential equilibrium stra tegy  
allows incumbents to  deter some entry by producing the outputs that 
would be produced by lo w -c o st incumbents.
1. It is more difficult to  think of examples in which an entrant 
could not form a reliable estim ate of the nature of factors that 
affected the c o s ts  of all firms. A union wage agreement would be 
observable by potential entrants. G eologists could a s s e s s  the likely 




























































































II. Duopoly when rival's c o s ts  are uncertain 
A. A one-period game
I work with a model of q u antity-settin g  o lig o p o ly / Analysis 
of duopoly equilibrium in the presence of uncertainty about the  
rival’s co st is a building block for the model of duopoly entry 
deterrence. In th is section , I examine equilibrium in a one-period  
game.
The inverse demand curve is linear,
(1) p - a -  0  ,
(where 0  is tota l output and the assumption that the slope of the  
demand curve is  -1  is not restrictive).
There are two incumbents, 1 and 2. Marginal c o st  is  constant, 
and takes one of two values. Marginal c o st  is either high (cH) or 
low (cL). There is nothing essentia l about the assum ption that 
th ese  values are the same for both firms.
At the start of the first period, each incumbent knows its  own 
marginal co st, but does not know the marginal c o st  of i t s  rival.
Prior beliefs are described by the probabilities
(2a) u12 = i 's  prior probability that 2 *s c o s ts  are high;
(2b) u21 = 2 's prior probability that i ' s  c o s ts  are high.
Prior beliefs are common knowledge. Following Harsanyi {1 967-683 , 
th is makes it possible to model the game as one of com plete but 
imperfect information w ith an initial move by nature that endows 
players w ith high or low c o s ts  with the indicated probabilities. 2
2. Milgrom and Roberts [1982] consider entry deterrence by a 
•quantity-setting monopolist. Bagwell and Ramey [1991] analyze price­
se ttin g  duopoly with product differentiation. The difference between  
Bagwell and Ramey’s results and those presented here does not depend 



























































































October 5, 1992 3
The natural generalization of Cournot equilibrium to  the present 
of uncertainty is to  require that each firm's noncooperative  
equilibrium output maximize it s  own expected profit, taking the  
outputs of rivals of different c o st  typ es as given .3 Payoffs are
(3a) "1L ‘ {a -  CL * -  (1 - “lZ^a. * U12q2H]}qiL
(3b) "lH = <a '  CH -  lqiH * (1 - ui2^ 2L * U>2q2H])qik
(3c) 712L '  <a -  ct -  1(1 '  U2<Jqil * u2iqiH + q2L^q2L
(3d) "2H * <a '  c l -  t(l -  “2i)q1L * u2.q1H * q2H]}q2H
The first-order conditions for maximization of th ese  payoffs 
yield the equations of reaction functions, which vary by firm and by 
co st type:
(4  a )
2 q .L ♦ (1  - u >2Jq 2L * ui2q2H -  a -  CL
(4b)
2 q .H * (1 - ui2 q̂a  * U12q 2 „  “  3 -  CH
(4c) U -' U2 1 ^ u . * U21q W * 2 q 2L '  3  ■- CL
(4d) (1  - u 2 1 ^ ,l * U2!q iH * 2 q 2H = 9  - CH
Solving the equations of the reaction functions gives equilibrium 
outputs:
(5a) qa -  £  [  a -  c , -  "■» (<;„ -  cL) ]  ,
(5b) qiH = 1  L  3 * C« ‘  ^  '  U;i(cH -  CL) ] ]  ,
(5C) q2L ’  1  C  a '  CL * 2Ua 2 U‘2(CH -  C0  ]  .
3. This is  the approach of Saloner's [1987] model of duopoly w ith  



























































































October 5, 1992 4
[ t  1 P  1 * U|2 ~ 2u21r. 1  ~ 1(5d) -  3 [_ a ~ cH -  2 (cH CLJ J  -
The expected payoff of each type firm is  the square of its  
equilibrium output. (This follow s from the equation of the reaction  
curve and the assumption that the slope of the demand curve is - 1.)
B. Pooling equilibrium in a tw o-period game without the possib ility
of entry
Now consider a tw o-period version of the previous model, and 
suppose that entry is not possible. Here I outline the conditions 
under which the following is a sequential equilibrium;
(a) both firms produce (a -  cL) /3  in period 1-,
(b) each firm produces it s  equilibrium output from the one-
period game with unknown c o st ty p es in period 2;
(c) firms carry prior beliefs forward from period 1 to  period 2 .
Out-of-equilibrium beliefs, which are not restricted  by the  
requirement of consistency  w ith Bayes' rule, are such that if a firm 
observes that its  rival produces any output other than (a -  ct } /3  in 
period 1, it  concludes that the rival has high c o st and maximizes its  
second-period payoff given th is belief.
This pooling equilibrium corresponds to  entry-lim iting behavior. 
Exploration of the conditions under which pooling will occur when 
entry is  not possible provides a point of reference for a more general 
model that allows for the possib ility  of entry.
If defection leads the rival to  conclude that the defecting firm 
has high co st, a lo w -c o st firm would never defect from such a pooling 
strategy . (a -  cL) /3  is the b est-resp on se  output of a lo w -co st  
duopolist if its  rival produces (a -  cL) /3 . Defection would reduce 



























































































October 5, 1992 5
to  expand output in the second p er io d ,red u c in g  the defector's  
second-period payoff as well.
If firm 1H follow s the pooling strategy , it s  expected  f ir s t-  
period payoff is
( 6 )
[a -  cH -  ^-(a -  cL)](a -  c ^ /3
2
* ?  [  3 ~ CH " ^ CH '  ClJ ]  * ? ( CH _ ClJ2 ’
I ts  expected second period payoff if it adheres to  the pooling  
stra tegy  is the square of equilibrium output from the one-period game 
w ith unknown co st typ es, given by equation C5b). Its  payoff for the  
game, ignoring discounting, is  the sum of it s  payoffs over the two 
periods.
If firm 1H defects, it reveals that it has high c o st. A 
defecting firm 1H will therefore produce a first-period  output that is 
its  best response to  the equilibrium output (a -  cL) /3  of firm 2.
The resulting first-period  payoff is
(7 ) ^  [ a '  CH ^ CH "  CL̂  ]
When firm 1H s e t s  i t s  second-period output, it does not know firm 
2's co st type. The output that maximizes firm lH’s expected  second  
period payoff, found by solving the system  of equations formed by the  
reaction functions of firms 1H, 2L, and 2H, is
4. The difference between firm IL's second period payoff if it 
follow s the pooling stra teg y  and its  payoff if it d efects in the first 
period is
-  u21)(cH -  clK») .
where (»), the sum of firm IL's second period outputs if it  follow s 
and if it d efects from the equilibrium strategy , is positive . Unless 
the rival's prior belief is that firm 1L has high co st w ith  
probability 1, firm 1H earns a greater second-period payoff by 




























































































(8 ) ^ ta * “ (1 hi2)(Cĵ  Ĉ )] ,
Its  expected  second-period payoff is the square of th is output.
Comparing adherence and defection payoffs, firm 1H will follow  
the pooling stra tegy  if
(9} g ( l  U2,) ^
3 -  4Uj
? -A ch -  CL) ]  2 ^ (cH -  cL) .UH 4
Evidently, th is condition fails if u21 is  sufficiently near 1. If 
firm 2 is convinced that firm 1 has high c o st, firm 1H is better  off 
defecting from a pooling strategy . But the left-hand side of (9) is 
larger as u12 is larger. It is  more in firm IH's in terest to  conceal its  
c o st type if it  believes firm 2 has high co sts .
A condition corresponding to  (9) must be met if firm 2H is to  
adhere to  the pooling strategy . Adherence by firm 2H is  more likely, 
the smaller is  u12 and the larger is  u21, just opp osite  the conditions on 
prior beliefs that make adherence by firm 1H likely. To show that 
there is a range of beliefs for which both firm 1H and firm 2H will 
follow th is pooling stra tegy , I turn to  the symmetric beliefs case.
If u ., = u , u, (9) becomes
CIO) a -  a [ l  -  U ♦ r - T - u ] f tcH - CL) .
As expected from (9), (10) fails if u is sufficiently near 1. As u 
goes to 0 , ( 10) becomes
(11) a -  cH 2 3(ch -  ct ) .
Hence if the c o s t  disadvantage of h ig h -co st firms is not to o  great and 
if firms are not too  certain that their rivals have high c o s ts , the  





























































































Suppose a -  10, cL -  1, cH -  2, u(2 - 0.4, and u21 -  0 .6. Then 
Firm 1H earns a payoff of 12.41 if it follow s the pooling stra tegy , 
while it s  defection payoff is 12 .33 . Firm 2H earns a payoff 12 .9 3  if 
it  pools, and 12.66 if it  defects. The condition (9) is  0 .3 3  > 0 .25  
for firm 1H and 0 .52  > 0 .25  for firm 2H. For th ese  parameter values, 
h ig h -co st firms earn greater payoffs by pooling in the first period.
III. Pooling equilibrium in a tw o-period game w ith entry
A. Structure of the game
Now modify the tw o-period game considered above by supposing t
there is a single entrant (E) who observes first period outputs before
deciding whether or not to  enter, who must pay a sunk entry c o s t  K >
to  come into the market, and who breaks even by staying out of the
market. The potential entrant's c o s ts  are either high or low and are
known to  the entrant but not to  the incumbents.
Prior beliefs are given by the probabilities
( 12a) u * incumbent i‘s prior probability that incumbent j's c o s ts  
are high, i, J « 1,2, i f  j;
Cl2b) v -  incumbents' prior probability that entrant's c o s t s  are high;
(1 2 c) w = entrant's prior probability that incumbent i's c o s ts  are 
high, i -  1. 2 .
For sim plicity I have imposed a limited symmetry of beliefs. This 
part of the specification  can be relaxed without altering the nature 
of the results. Prior beliefs are common knowledge.
B. A precondition for entry limitation
To determine conditions under which it  is  possible for incumbents 
to  pool output in the first period and limit the entry of h ig h -c o st  



























































































October 5, 1992 8
the game played in the second period if entry occurs but each firm 
knows only its  own co st type. In such a game, each firm of each co st  
type maximizes it s  expected  profit. That of a lo w -c o st firm 1. for 
example, is
(13) 711L = {a -  cL -  [qiL * (1 -  u)qa  * uq ^  -  (1 -  v)q£L * vq^ D q^
The first-order conditions for the maximization of expected  
profit by three firms, of two c o st types each, can be solved for 
equilibrium outputs. The equilibrium outputs of lo w -c o st and high- 
co st entrants are
(14a) q£L = 2j-la -  cL -  (u + v -  3w)(cH -  cL)]
(14b) qEH = ^-[a - c H - ( l  * u + v - 3w)(cH -  cL)]
respectively. Expected payoffs are the squares of equilibrium 
outputs, le s s  sunk c o s ts  of entry K.
The expected  profit of a lo w -co st entrant exceeds the expected  
profit of a h ig h -co st entrant. If a lo w -co st entrant's expected  
profit from entry is negative, then incumbents can preclude all entry 
by pooling in the first period. If a h ig h -co st entrant's expected  
profit is  positive, then incumbents cannot limit entry. The 
intermediate case  is that in which a lo w -co st entrant ex p e cts  a 
positive  profit, but a h ig h -co st entrant a negative profit. This 
occurs if
a -  cL -  (u * v -  3w)(cH -  cL) z 4 *JK
( 1 5 )
> a - c L - ( 2 f U  + v -  3w ) (ch  -  cL) , 
a condition I henceforth assume is met. It is then possib le for 
incumbents to  limit the entry by h ig h -co st entrants. I now outline 




























































































October 5, 1992 9
C. Equilibrium oligopoly limit pricing
Structure of the equilibrium pooling stra tegy
I investigate a pooling entry-lim iting sequential equilibrium 
w ith  the following characteristics:
(a) incumbent duopolists each produce (a -  cL) /3  in period 1;
(b) a h igh -cost entrant sta y s  out in period 2 :
(c) a lo w -co st entrant com es in in period 2 ;
(d) if entry does not occur, incumbents produce the appropriate
outputs from (5);
(e) if entry occurs, the entrant is revealed as having lo w -c o st,
while incumbents' c o st  typ es are unknown excep t to  
them selves. Each player produces the second-period output 
that maximizes it s  expected  payoff, given prior beliefs:
(f) incumbents and the lo w -co st entrant carry prior beliefs
forward from the first to  the second period.
Out-of-equilibrium beliefs are not restricted  by the requirements of 
sequential equilibrium. I assume that if an incumbent produces any 
output other than (a -  cL) /3  in period 1, i t s  rivals conclude that 
the defecting firm has high co st. Incumbents' payoffs are the sum of 
their payoffs in the two periods.
Second period equilibrium payoffs
If the pooling stra tegy  is  followed, entry will occur only if the  
entrant has low cost. Incumbents' prior probability for th is  is  (1 -  v). 
Hence if the pooling stra teg y  is  followed, incumbents exp ect entry to  
occur w ith probability 1 -  v.
If entry occurs, the entrant is revealed as having low c o s t , but 
an incumbent’s co st type is  known only to itse lf. Equilibrium outputs 
are found by solving the system  of 5 equations given by the reaction  
functions of the entrant and incumbents 1L, 1H, 2L, 2H, and EL. They
are
Cl6 a) - cL -  (u -  w)(cH -  cL))



























































































October 5, 1992 10
(16c] q£L = ^-[a -  cL + (u -  3w](cH -  cL)] .
An incumbent's expected payoff is  the square of i t s  output. The low - 
c o st entrant's expected  payoff is the square of i t s  output, le s s  sunk 
entry co st K.
The entrant's output, and therefore payoff, in th is 5-player game 
exceeds equilibrium output (14a) of the lo w -co st entrant in the 6 -  
player game treated above. Condition (15) therefore implies that 
output (16c) yields the lo w -co st entrant a positive  expected  profit.
If entry does not occur, an event which incumbents regard as 
having probability v, incumbents' expected second-period payoffs are 
those of the one-period game w ith unknown c o s t  ty p es (using (5) and
(1 2 ))
(1 7a ) n IL = ™2L * g [a CL + 2^CH cL)l2
(17b) n !H n 2H "  g ta CH 2 ^CH -  CL))2
Behavior of the entrant
In equilibrium, the entrant acquires no information about 
incumbents' c o st  types by observing first-period  output. The alleged  
equilibrium stra tegy  calls for the potential entrant to  come in if 
expected profit from entry is positive, and otherw ise to  sta y  out.
Given its  beliefs, the entrant maximizes it s  expected  payoff by 
behaving in th is way.
Behavior of lo w -c o st incumbents
If a lo w -co st incumbent produces any output other than (a -  cL) /3  
in period 1, it reduces it s  expected first-period  payoff and portrays 
itse lf  as a h ig h -co st firm to  the other incumbent and to  the entrant. 



























































































October 5, 1992 11
than if the equilibrium stra tegy  were followed. It does not reduce, 
and may increase, the probability of entry. F irst-period defection  
therefore reduces the expected  second-period payoff as well as the  
expected first-period payoff. It follow s that a lo w -c o st  incumbent 
would never defect from the stra tegy  outlined above.
Behavior of h ig h -co st incumbents
A h ig h -co st incumbent’s expected  payoff from adhering to  the  
alleged sequential equilibrium stra tegy  is
(18)
gta CH " CL̂ 2 " 4 ĈH " CL̂ 2 +
| [ a  '  ch -  1 2 U(c« -  ClJ ]  + T r C 8 * ch -  «  -  u * w^(cH -
where the first two terms give the first-period  payoff and the final 
two terms are the expected  second-period payoff.
Given the nature of out-of-equilibrium  beliefs, if firm 1H 
defects it will produce an output that maximizes i t s  first-period  
payoff. The resulting defection payoff in the first period is
cL)
(19) g(a -  Cjj -  2 ĉh ~ CL̂
By defecting, firm 1H reveals itse lf as a h ig h -c o st firm. It is  
no longer certain that a h ig h -co st entrant will s ta y  out in the second  
period. To evaluate second-period payoffs, two ca ses  must be 
considered.
H incumbent defection does not make EH entry profitable 
Suppose first that a single h ig h -co st firm could defect w ithout 
making it profitable for a h ig h -co st entrant to  come into the market.
A condition for th is to  occur is given in the following section . At 
the time firm 1H decides whether or not it will defect from the  



























































































October 5, 1992 1 2
sc e n a r io s . If i t  d e fe c ts ,  i t  re v e a ls  i t s e l f  a s  h av in g  h ig h  c o s t .
With probability v the potential entrant has high co st and sta y s  out
of the market in the second-period. Second-period outputs are
determined by solving the equations of the reaction functions for
firms 1H, 2L, and 2H;
(20a) 2q,H * Cl -  u)q2L + Uq2H = 3 ' CH
(20b) * 2 ^2L = a -  cL
(20c) * 2 <,2H = a -  cH •
Solving th is system  of equations, firm lH's second-period output if 
entry does not occur after defection is
(2 1 ) ^-[a - cH -  (1 -  u)(cH -  cL)] .
Its  second-period payoff in th is case is the square of i t s  output.
With probability 1 -  v, the entrant has low c o s t  and will come 
into the market in the second period. Second period outputs are 
determined by the reaction functions for firms 1H, 2L, 2H. and EL:
(2 2 a ) 2q + (1 4ih ' -  u )q a * Uq2H * qEL =
(22b) * 2 q 2L + qEL - a  * CL
(2 2 c ) * 2 q 2H + qEL ^ a -  cH
(22d) q (1 -  MH w iq ^  - Wq2H * 2qEt "
In entry occurs, firm lH's p o st-en try  output is
(23) i | >  -  c„ -  4 ~ 32U  ̂ W(c„ - cL) ]  ,
and its  second-period expected  payoff is the square of th is output. 
Firm lH ’s  expected  payoff if it defects from the stra teg y  is
g"£ a — Cĵ  — 2"(Ch “ c^) J + ~ — (2 — u)(c^ — cL)]
(24)



























































































October 5, 1992 13
If firm 1H adheres to  the pooling strategy , on the other hand, 
it s  expected payoff is given by (18). Comparing (18) and (24), firm 
1H will earn at least as great a payoff by adhering to  the pooling 
stra tegy  as by defecting if
If v = 1, the first term on the left vanishes. If firm 1H 
believes the entrant has high co st, it believes that entry will not 
occur. The lo ss  of profit on defection is expected  to  come from 
revealing to  firm 2 that firm 1 has high co st. This explains the 
similarity between the left-hand side of (9) and the second term in
(25).
If u -  1, the second term on the left vanishes. If firm 2 
believes that firm 1 has high c o st, then firm lH's defection from the  
equilibrium stra tegy  provides firm 2 w ith no new information. The 
lo ss  of profit on defection is  expected  to  come from revealing to  the  
entrant that firm 1 has high cost.
H incumbent defection makes EH entry profitable
If a h ig h -co st entrant would come into the market, knowing that 
one incumbent has high c o st, then the fact of entry does not reveal 
the entrant's co st type. Second-period outputs are found by solving  
the equations of reaction curves for firms 1H, 2L, 2H. EL, and EH.
The resulting equilibrium outputs are
6 -  V  3y-^H -  cl ) ] ( 2  -  u -  w)
(25)
(26a) 2
(26b) . 2 - u ♦ 2v 2



























































































October 5, 1992 14
(26(1) = ^-[a - cL * -  — 22v * 3w (cH -  cL)]
(26e) = i [ a -  cH - u * ? 2 3W(ch " CL  ̂ •
The condition for defection to  induce entry by a h ig h -co st potential 
entrant is that such an entrant expect a nonnegative payoff after  
entry. From (26e), th is  will be the case if
(27) a -  cH -  14 * 2V2 ~ 3w (ch -  cL) > 4^|K .
If inequality (27) is  not met, then the defection payoff is given by 
(24) and the analysis of the previous section  applies. If (27) holds, 
firm lH's defection payoff is
(28) ̂ [ a  -  cH -  i ( c „  -  cL) ]  * j ^ [ a  - cH -  4 ~ > 3u (cH -  
Comparing (18) and (28), when defection leads a h ig h -co st entrant to  
come into the market, firm 1H will prefer to follow the sequential 
equilibrium stra tegy  if
v ( i  -  T V ) [ >  -  cH -  4 -  3u - ?v .  w(Ch .  c0y
*  -  CH  -  - - - ^ -" - - - — (C h  -  c0  ]  ( 2  -  U  - 2 v  -  W ) (C H
-  | [ a  -  cH -  5...- . 4U. -  2v w ^  .  ^  ]  (3  -  2u -  2 v  *  w ) (c „  -
(2 9 )
2 ? ( CH -  Cl /
The first term on the left reflects the expected  lo ss  of profit 
if the entrant has high c o st and comes into the market in the  
knowledge that at least one of the incumbents has high co st. This 
term makes it more likely that h ig h -co st incumbents will be willing to  
pool in the first period, and it appears precisely because there is  




























































































October 5, 1992 15
Observe further that if v = 0, conditions (25) and (29) are 
identical. If incumbents believe that the potential entrant has low 
co st w ith probability 1, their incentives to  pool are unrelated to  the 
decisions that a h ig h -co st entrant would make. If v -  1, h ig h -co st  
incumbents will pool if they  earn a sufficiently greater payoff in the  
second period by keeping their co st types hidden.
Examples
Let a = 10, u = 0.4, v = 0.5, and w = 0.6. In a 6 -p layer game 
with unknown c o st types, entrants outputs would be qEL « 2 .4 7 5  and 
qEH = 1 .975. For any entry c o st  le s s  than 3.9, a h ig h -co st entrant 
would come into the market against incumbents of unknown c o s t  types. 
Entry lim itation would therefore be impossible. For entry c o s ts  
greater than 6 .125 , even a io w -co st entry would s ta y  out against 
incumbents of unknown c o st types.
Suppose entry co st K » 4. If a h ig h -co st firm d efects in the 
first period, and a h ig h -co st entrant would produce output 2.3 in the  
second period and expect a profit 1.29. Defection by a h ig h -co st  
incumbent would therefore induce entry by a h ig h -c o st entrant. A 
h ig h -co st incumbent’s payoff if it pools in the first period is 10.73, 
while defection brings it only 9.14.
If on the other hand K = 6 , a h ig h -co st entrant would sta y  out of 
the market even if defection were to  reveal th at one of the incumbents 
had high co st. A h ig h -co st incumbent's payoff if follow s the pooling 
stra tegy  is again 10.73, against 10.53 if it defects.
IV. Conclusion
Limit pricing fails as an equilibrium stra teg y  in Bagwell and 
Ramey (1 9 9 1 ) because the entry decision depends on an industry-wide 



























































































October 5, 1992 16
In the model developed here, the entry decision depends on firm- 
specific co st parameters, and limit pricing may emerge as a sequential 
equilibrium oligopoly strategy . Part of the incentive to  adhere to  
such a stra teg y  is  the second-period profit that is expected  to  be 
preserved if entry is  deterred.
Two conclusions may be drawn. First, where uncertainty about 
c o s ts  is firm -specific rather than industry-specific, o ligop o listic  
entry deterrence is a possib ility . Second, the likelihood that such a 
strategy  will emerge as a noncooperative equilibrium falls as the  
number of incumbents rises, since the expected saving in profit from 
deterring entry falls, the larger the number of incumbents.5
5. This can be shown formally be generalizing the model presented  
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